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advice: in philosophy, we should have respect for the intuitive sense of an unsolved
problem, and tolerance for long periods of the absence of an answer ðThomas
Nagel, Mortal Questions ½Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, x–xiiÞ.
Hyunseop Kim
Seoul National University

Brandom, Robert. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. 289. $35.00 ðclothÞ.
One of the better known of the many bons mots of the Sellarsian corpus concerns his definition of philosophy: it is the attempt to understand “how things in
the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible
sense of the term.” When applied to Sellars’s philosophy in particular, one might
be forgiven for doubting the possible success of such an endeavor. Richard Rorty
once quipped of Sellars’s followers that they were either “left-wing” or “rightwing,” emphasizing one line of thought in Sellars’s work to the exclusion of the
other. The two lines of thought to which Rorty referred were, first, Sellars’s conception of the normativity of all thought and language, famously captured by his
evocative phrase “the space of reasons.” Second, and equally important to Sellars,
was his “scientia mensura,” the notion ðshared with contemporaries such as QuineÞ
that “in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not” ðWilfrid
Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 ½1956: §41, 303Þ. The left-wing adherents to the normativity thesis included Rorty himself, along with John McDowell and Robert Brandom.
Among the right-wing naturalists are such as Ruth Milliken, Jay Rosenberg, and
Paul Churchland. Such a disparate group of philosophers suggests irreconcilable differences. Brandom himself reports in the introduction to his newest book,
From Empiricism to Expressivism, that, “for a dismayingly long time, I did not really
see how all the pieces of ½Sellars’s work hung together, even in the broadest possible sense of the term” ð24Þ.
Like Rorty, Brandom sees a fundamental divide in Sellars, though for Brandom the divide is between two broadly “Kantian” themes or “axes” around which
he sees much of the rest of Sellars’s work revolving. Brandom argues that the
first axis starts from Kant’s conception of a privileged set of “categorial” concepts
and consists in a distinction between concepts whose job it is to describe the world
and concepts “whose principle expressive role is rather to make explicit essential
features of the framework within which empirical description and explanation
are possible” ð24Þ. Brandom thus argues that in Sellars’s work Kant’s ðinÞfamous
“Pure Categories of the Understanding” are redescribed in terms of a metalinguistic expressivism. The second axis is that of a “detranscendentalized” version
of Kant’s ðinÞfamous phenomena/noumena distinction, upon which Sellars based
his scientific naturalism and which is best understood in terms of a contrast between two “images”—the “manifest” and the “scientific”—with the scientific image
understood as providing the ontologically privileged description of the world.
Ethics Apr 2016, Volume 126, Issue 3, pp. 808 - 816
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Brandom argues that the first axis constitutes some of Sellars’s most innovative and insightful work, while the second axis—Sellars’s naturalism—is something that should be cast off as both philosophically problematic and inconsistent with Sellars’s own best insights ð80Þ. Concerning these two axes Brandom
has given us a collection of seven papers, three of which are previously published. In general, the papers build heavily on ideas familiar from Brandom’s
previous work. Chapter 1 gives a helpful overview of Sellars’s philosophy and articulates the main thrust of Brandom’s interpretation, which he then develops
over the ensuing chapters. Chapters 2 and 3, both previously published, provide a reading of Sellars’s most famous work, “Empiricism and the Philosophy
of Mind,” and develop an original line of thought concerning Sellars’s rejection
of empiricism, focusing in particular on empiricism’s inability to adequately explain modal language and concepts. Chapters 4 and 5 primarily develop the conception of modality put to work in these initial chapters, culminating, in chapter 6, in a critique of Sellars’s naturalism. Finally, chapter 7 utilizes the “expressivist”
account of alethic and deontic modals developed in the previous chapters to explicate Sellars’s nominalism.
In the rest of this review I discuss some aspects of Brandom’s arguments
concerning the two “axes” of thought identified above. My main goal here is not
to provide in-depth criticism of Brandom’s arguments so much as discuss the
overall shape of his interpretation of Sellars, as well as places where one might
part ways with Brandom. In particular, I focus on Brandom’s discussion of Sellars’s expressivist treatment of modality ð§1Þ and his proposal for reading Sellars
as endorsing a pragmatist-inspired form of naturalism ð§2Þ.
I. SELLARS’S EXPRESSIVISM
The first of the two main “axes” or “master ideas” ð35Þ of Sellars’s thought that
Brandom characterizes consists in Sellars’s “expressivism” ðmore on Brandom’s
use of this term in a momentÞ concerning alethic and deontic modals. Brandom
argues that this position has deep Kantian roots, and that Sellars’s treatment of
modal language is a development of Kant’s conception of a “pure” concept or
category, which governs the application of empirical concepts. As Brandom puts
it, “the expressive role of the pure concepts is, roughly, to make explicit what is
implicit in the use of ground-level concepts: the conditions under which alone it
is possible to apply them, which is to say, use them to make judgments” ð37Þ.
Brandom understands Kant’s position regarding the status of the a priori
categories as having two features—namely, categoricity and a priority. As the quote
above indicates, Brandom construes the categoricity of the pure concepts of the
understanding as constituted by their role in explicating the conditions under
which any empirical concept could be applied. The a priority of these concepts
consists, for Brandom, in “being able to deploy ordinary empirical descriptive
concepts ½such that one already knows how to do everything one needs to know
how to do in order to be able to deploy the concepts that play the expressive role
characteristic of ½the categories” ð39Þ.
Brandom’s point here is not merely that one must have some concepts in
order to possess ðand thus applyÞ others. This would be to say that the catego-
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ries are semantic components of all our other concepts. This seems to have in
fact been Kant’s view, made clear by his talk of the categories as the “highest”
concepts and as jointly constitutive of the most general concept of all, the concept object, which is itself always employed in our thinking about the world ðon
this point, see Clinton Tolley, “The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic,”
Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 ½2012: 417–46, esp. §6Þ. Rather, Brandom is
conceiving of the categories as the semantic correlate of an underlying set of abilities which themselves are called upon in the making of any empirical judgment
whatsoever. Put in Brandom’s pragmatic expressivist terms, the kinds of things
one has to be able to know how to do in order to make judgments with ordinary
empirical content, include the abilities necessary to make judgments whose content includes the categories.
Brandom thus construes Kant as having had two key insights ðI leave aside
here whether Brandom’s Kant is in fact KantÞ, which Sellars then capitalizes on.
The first is that some of our concepts govern, in a certain sense, and are thus
necessary for, the deployment of other concepts. The second is that the sense in
which a class of concepts might be necessary for another is not, or need not be,
merely semantic but rather can consist in the particular kinds of abilities necessary for their deployment.
Brandom then argues that Sellars takes up these points in his treatment
of alethic and deontic modals, and that this forms the basis of Brandom’s own
brand of pragmatic inferentialism. In a passage which Brandom returns to time
and again in the essay collection, Sellars, speaking of modal concepts, says, “once
the tautology ‘the world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the
idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear
to an ungrudging recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not inferior, just different” ðWilfrid Sellars, “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities,” in Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell
½Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957, §79Þ.
In what sense are modal or deontic expressions different? Brandom points
to Sellars’s discussion of modal language as “metalinguistic” ð186Þ. However,
Brandom cautions that calling modal talk metalingusitic is also misleading ðmuch
like calling Kant’s conception of the categories ‘metaconceptual’Þ. One would
expect, in appealing to the metalinguistic, that modal talk would thus be talk
about ðfirst-orderÞ talk. Indeed, Brandom quotes approvingly of Sellars’s claim
that, “to make first hand use of these ½modal expressions is to be about the business of explaining a state of affairs, or justifying an assertion. Thus, even if to state
that p entails q is, in a legitimate sense, to state that something is the case, the
primary use of ‘p entails q’ is not to state that something is the case, but to explain why q, or justify the assertion that q ” ð“Counterfactuals,” 283Þ. Thus according to Brandom’s Sellars, “what one is doing in using modal expressions is
explaining, justifying, or endorsing an inference” ð136Þ.
Now, this should seem a surprising claim, if for no other reason than that
saying, for example, that anything that is hot enough to melt copper must also
be hot enough to melt aluminum seems to be saying something about heat, copper,
and aluminum, not about the concepts we use to pick out those things, or about
sentences or inferences in which those concepts figure. By way of replay to this
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worry Brandom notes that Sellars distinguishes between what is actually said and
what is “contextually implied” in an assertion involving modal terms ð139Þ, which
suggests that modal language could have a dual role. But Sellars also never fully explains what he means by such “contextual implication,” using ðhere Brandom draws
on a different and prior paperÞ only the following suggestive example: “there are
two senses in which an utterance can be said to convey information. There is the
sense in which my early morning utterance, “The sky is clear,” conveys meteorological information; and there is the sense in which it conveys information
about my state of mind. Let us use the term ‘asserts’ for the first sense of ‘conveys,’ and ‘conveys’ for the second” ðWilfrid Sellars, “Inference and Meaning,”
Mind 62 ½1953: 333Þ.
Alternately put, we could say that, according to Sellars, in asserting that the
sky is clear one reports a ðputativeÞ fact while expressing one’s mental state ðin this
case, a beliefÞ. The move then is to say that in using modal talk, such as in making
the statement that “it is impossible for something to melt copper but not aluminum” one is not, in what is said or reported, describing a modal fact, but rather
expressing a mental state ðor state typeÞ, for example, of approval for a certain
class of inferences from the melting point of copper to the melting point of aluminum. This seems to be how Sellars sees it. On his view the mental state type
is a form of approval, and specifically, approval of an inference pattern. Roughly,
if our original sentence was
This torch melted the copper so it must melt the aluminum
then according to Sellars’s view, we should understand this “must” as an endorsement of the inference pattern x melts copper x melts aluminum.
According to Sellars, similar things would be said for causal talk, or talk
appealing to laws. Brandom notes, too, that the goodness of such inferences is
defeasible, since the kind of conceptual cum inferential connections that underwrite these endorsements are nonmonotonic ð192–93Þ.
The resultant view is what Brandom calls the “Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis”
ðthere is a “Normative Kant-Sellars Thesis” as wellÞ. According to this, all empirical descriptive concepts depend for their application on the subject’s grasp
of patterns of inference, and it is precisely these kinds of patterns which modal
concepts explicitly capture ð67, 151–52Þ. Thus, the Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis construes all descriptive empirical concepts as suffused with modal notions.
For example, on this view of empirical concepts, grasp of even basic recognitional concepts, like the concept red, requires not only the ability to sort ðparadigmaticÞ red things from nonred things, but also the ðtacit or implicitÞ endorsement of inferences, such as those from “x is red” to “x is colored” or from “x is
red” to “x is extended.” Modal concepts are then supposed to be what allow
us to explicitly capture such endorsement. To say that “necessarily, if x is red
then x is colored” is making it explicit what one is doing in accepting ðor
asserting or believingÞ that something is red ðfor a related approach to modality
that also builds on Sellars, see Amie L. Thomasson, “Modal Normativism and
the Methods of Metaphysics,” Philosophical Topics 35 ½2007: 135–60Þ.
The Normative Kant-Sellars Thesis makes a similar claim about deontic
modals—namely, that empirical concept application depends on the implicit grasp
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of deontic modal concepts such as obligation and entitlement. Brandom’s argument here again depends on the tight connection he sees between concept application ðunderstood as the “deployment of a vocabulary” ½168Þ and assertion
and inference. Though Brandom does not extensively develop the idea in this
book ðthough see his Making It Explicit ½Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1994Þ, the Normative Kant-Sellars Thesis considers the linguistic practice of assertion as depending on the conditions under which one can be understood as
making a particular claim, such as that a swatch of cloth is red. In making this
claim one is also committed to others, such as that the swatch of cloth is colored
ð169Þ. On Brandom’s view, one does not count as a competent concept-user if
one does not have a grasp of the kinds of commitments one implicitly makes in
an explicit act of assertion. Making a claim is thus “taking up a particular sort of
normative stance toward an inferentially articulated content. It is endorsing it, taking responsibility for it, committing oneself to it” ð170Þ. Correspondingly, since the
content of every assertion is part of a broader inferential web, one is entitled to
assert those claims to which one is committed.
So, as with the previous example, in making the assertion that the swatch
is red, one is committed to the claim that it is colored and is likewise entitled
to make the inference and the corresponding assertion of its being colored.
Brandom further argues ð170–72Þ that since an at least implicit understanding
of normative statuses like commitment and entitlement is necessary for deploying concepts in acts of judgment then normative concepts and vocabulary are
basically legitimate. Broadly put, “the semantic relations between what is expressed
by the use of empirical descriptive vocabulary, on the one hand, and what is expressed by the use of modal and what ðsomething differentÞ is expressed by normative vocabulary, on the other, are essentially pragmatically mediated ones. To understand the relation between how things merely are and how they must be or ða
different matterÞ ought to be, one must look at what one is thereby doing” ð173Þ.
At this point one might have noticed that Brandom’s use of “expressivism”
and its cognates differs from its more widespread use in metaethics and elsewhere. Exactly how to understand expressivism generally, and Brandom’s brand
in particular is a large topic—too large for me to adequately discuss here. But the
basic idea which Brandom, Sellars, and contemporary versions of expressivism
share is one according to which some areas of discourse have as their primary communicative function not the describing or reporting of states of affairs, but rather
the expression of some pro or con attitude ðnote that this is compatible with there
nevertheless being something described or reported in the relevant utterance or
sentenceÞ. According to Sellars’s and Brandom’s construal of expressivism, what is
expressed is a commitment to certain patterns of meaning-constituting inference.
Saying “the stoplight is red” commits one to endorsing patterns of inference from
that sentence to sentences such as “the stoplight is not green” and “red is a color.”
Brandom further uses “expressivism” to describe the position according to which
one has developed a vocabulary for articulating the kinds of expressive acts one
must engage in to successfully execute the relevant linguistic act. Elsewhere Brandom puts it this way, “we might think of the process of expression in the more
complex and interesting cases as a matter not of transforming what is inner into
what is outer but of making explicit what is implicit. This can be understood in a
pragmatist sense of turning something we can initially only do into something
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we can say: codifying some sort of knowing how in the form of a knowing that ”
ðArticulating Reasons ½Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, 8Þ.
Thus, Brandom is specifically thinking of expressivism in terms of ðiÞ a differentiation between kinds of speech act—namely, reporting and expressing;
ðiiÞ the primacy of expressing over reporting; and ðiiiÞ the explicit articulation of
a vocabulary for describing the expressive acts necessary for some act of describing or reporting ðfor defense of a Brandom-inspired version of expressivism
in metaethics, see Matthew Chrisman, “Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving
the Debate,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 ½2008: 334–58Þ.
At this point, much of what Brandom has to say concerning the expressivist
treatment of modality is an elaboration of Brandom’s own Sellars-inspired views
ð198Þ rather than of Sellars himself. Partly, this comes in the form of developing a
form of pragmatism Brandom takes to be merely implicit in Sellars’s philosophy.
But it also comes in explicit departures from Sellars’s position. Nowhere is this
clearer than in Brandom’s attempt to combine the expressivist view just articulated with a particular brand of modal realism ð89–91, 190–91Þ. Why endorse a
form of realism? Brandom rightfully worries that Sellars’s distinction between
reporting and expressing still requires that something be reported, and that it
isn’t at all clear what would be reported on the view that Sellars himself articulates. The notion that expressivism and realism are compatible is not itself new,
having been endorsed, for example, by metaethical forms of expressivism ðe.g.,
David Copp, “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,” Social
Philosophy and Policy 18 ½2001: 1–43Þ. Brandom takes advantage of this to develop
his own version of Sellars’s view of modality.
However, the “realism” that Brandom has in mind is quite minimal. He articulates it in terms of three theses ð195Þ: “ðMR1Þ Some modally qualified claims
are true. ðMR2Þ Those that are state facts. ðMR3Þ Some of those facts are objective,
in the sense that they are independent of the activities of concept users: they
would be facts even if there never were or never had been concept users.”
The notion of a “fact” appealed to here is that of a Fregean “Thought” or
“thinkable,” not a ðmind-independentÞ state of affairs understood as consisting of an object and a property or universal ð195Þ. Thus Brandom’s realism is not
likely to be one which would appeal to anyone who would endorse anything like
the modal realism popular in post-Kripkean ðand especially LewisianÞ versions of
possible world semantics.
What then are objective modal facts on Brandom’s view? According to Brandom they are sets of incompatibility relations stemming from the kinds of material consequence relations empirical judgments may stand in ð199–203Þ. For
example, what makes the property red the property that it is, according to Brandom, is its standing in a web of relations to other properties ðor classes of propertiesÞ, some of which are ðnonlogicallyÞ compatible, and some of which are not.
For example, it is compatible ðindeed, requiredÞ with something’s being ðentirelyÞ
red that it is extended, but not that it is green. Thus Brandom construes properties as exhibiting the very same kind of holistic determinacy relations that he does
for concepts. Moreover, since Brandom is conceiving of these objective facts as
thinkables, it isn’t clear that there is any ultimate distinction to be made between relations of property compatibility and incompatiblity that isn’t also to be
made for conceptual relations of compatiblity and incompatibility. It isn’t just
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that, on Brandom’s view, when we get the conceptual issues right that our judgments adequately track the facts in the world. Rather, the conceptual order and
the factual order seem for Brandom to come to the same thing. Thus the fact
that these two go in such lockstep might, at least for some, undermine the sense
in which Brandom delivers a genuine form of realism.
That Brandom’s position is a departure from Sellars himself is quite clear,
since Sellars explicitly denies that there are modal facts. In the same article from
which much of Brandom’s exposition is drawn Sellars says,
The idea that the world can, in principle, be so described that the description contains no modal expression is of a piece with the idea that the world
can, in principle, be so described that the description contains no prescriptive expression. For what is being called to mind is the ideal of a statement
of ‘everything that is the case’ which, however, serves through and through,
only the purpose of stating what is the case. And it is a logical truth that such
a description, however many modal expressions might properly be used in
arriving at it, or in justifying it, or in showing the relevance of one of its components to another, could contain no modal expression. ð“Counterfactuals,”
283Þ
The motivation for Sellars’s conception of the world as all that is the case,
and as not containing either modal or deontic facts, is part of his naturalism.
Brandom explicitly rejects this part of Sellars’s work, and it is to this issue that
we’ll now turn.
II. NATURALISM AND PRAGMATISM
I’ve presented Brandom as arguing that the best way to understand Sellars’s views
on modality is to construe him as distinguishing between what a statement says
and what it conveys or expresses. Brandom then argued that the notion of “expression” is best understood in terms of approval or disapproval of certain kinds
of activity—namely patterns of inferential reasoning. Brandom describes this
conception of the modal as part of Sellars’s antiempiricist argument that the
empirical/descriptive depends on the modal, not in the sense that modal concepts are needed to refer to a particular subject matter, but rather that the kinds
of inferential abilities and patterns that modal language explicates are themselves necessary for the having and applying of any empirical descriptive concepts
whatsoever. All of this constitutes Brandom’s elaboration of the first Kantian “axis”
of Sellars’s thought.
Brandom’s other positive contribution to our understanding of Sellars is his
suggestion that we replace the second axis—Sellars’s naturalism, as informed by a
privileging of science and its ontology—with a pragmatic naturalism. Though this
idea is not extensively developed in the book—Brandom focuses more on a complex negative argument against Sellarsian naturalism—it is significant for attempting to show how a “left-wing”, nonscientistic conception of nature and the natural
might be developed from motivations inherent in Sellars’s own work.
Despite Sellars’s claim, quoted in Section I above, that we should not view
nondescriptive concepts or language as inferior, just different, Sellars neverthe-
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less seems to privilege description in the coming to know of what there is, and
ðidealÞ science as providing the lingua franca for that description. Brandom
suggests that this is a mistake. Adopting a distinction first made by Huw Price
ð“Naturalism without Representationalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. D. MacArthur and M. Caro ½Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004, 71–88Þ, Brandom distinguishes between two kinds of naturalism. According to the first, “object
naturalism,” the naturalistic project is one of showing how, given a representationalist semantics for the relevant area of discourse, the corresponding states of affairs might be “placed” or otherwise fit in with a particular privileged conception
of the world ðBrandom presents Frank Jackson’s “location problem” as a prime
example of this; see Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics ½Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000Þ.
In contrast, according to the second, “subject naturalism” that Brandom recommends, the naturalist “makes no assumptions about whether the target vocabulary admits of a properly representational semantics” ð91Þ. Instead of solving a
“location problem,” the subject naturalist seeks an account of the practices which
underlie the thought and talk of the relevant subject. Brandom then argues that
Sellars’s insights concerning the expressive nature of modal talk ðand the normative generallyÞ are best suited to a form of subject naturalism.
Brandom illustrates the conception of subject naturalism with the example
of naturalist treatments of mathematics. If one were an object naturalist one
would likely find mathematical talk troublesome, as it would seem to require
an ontology of nonphysical abstracta. Brandom suggests that this problem could
be avoided by adopting a form of subject naturalism. In particular, the subject
naturalist aims at constructing a pragmatic, rather than referential, metasemantic theory. This is accomplished by appeal to what Brandom calls a “pragmatic
metavocabulary” which “enables one to talk about what one is doing in using linguistic expressions” ð189Þ. Why would this assuage one’s naturalistic worries?
Brandom claims that if we attend to the abilities and practices that underly some
area of discourse and find them to be naturalistically acceptable then “there
need be no fear that anything is going on that is puzzling from a naturalistic point
of view” ð92Þ.
This conception of naturalism as dissolving worries about ontological commitment by appeal to the mundane sorts of abilities required to engage in a particular form of discourse has deeply Wittgensteinian roots and bears a strong
resemblance, in spirit if not in letter, to the “second naturalism” of Brandom’s
Pittsburgh colleague John McDowell ðsee chap. 4 of Mind and World ½Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996Þ. Brandom’s pragmatic naturalism is also agnostic as what constitutes the fundamental or privileged level of descriptive discourse. It could be ðidealÞ physics, the special sciences, the ordinary empirical
discourse of the “folk,” or something else entirely.
However, it isn’t obvious that Brandom’s proposal for a more relaxed or
“extended” naturalism ð95Þ is really going to resolve the kinds of ontological
worry typically generated by its less relaxed adherents. For example, mathematical discourse raises worries for naturalism, among other reasons, because of our
inability to satisfactorily explain the reliability of mathematical practice in generating knowledge, especially if this reliability is couched in causal terms. The
fact that we can articulate a pragmatic metavocabulary explicating the sorts of
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things one must do in being initiated into ðwhat we might callÞ the “mathematical community of discourse” without invoking any mysterious abilities doesn’t
neutralize the epistemological worry, but rather exacerbates it. It is precisely because
we consider nothing unusual to be going on in the learning of mathematics ðor
being initiated into the mathematical communityÞ that we become perplexed
as to the cognitive workings underlying mathematical knowledge. Brandom concedes that such considerations might “throw doubt on the aptness of this sort
of discourse to the kind of representationalist semantic treatment that can be
seen to be the source of these difficulties” ð92Þ. But if this is right it would seem
that the kind of subject naturalism that Brandom is offering provides insufficient defense from the sorts of, for example, causal considerations that typically
lead one to put scientific considerations first in the order of explanation and
to designate as ultimately “noncognitive,” “nondescriptive,” or “nonfactual,” those
areas of discourse that sit poorly with what our best science tells us is the case.
Thus it would appear that even if subject and object naturalism are distinguished
by different methodologies, the results might be largely the same.
Such worries aside, Brandom’s discussion of Sellars is extremely rich. I’ve
considered only some aspects of the central themes of the book. There is much
else besides, including an extensive discussion of Sellars’s critique of empirical
“givenness,” his conception of observation, and a complex critique of Sellars’s naturalism based on the nature of sortal concepts and their application conditions.
Brandom offers a compelling, if very opinionated, take on central aspects of Sellars’s work. Those interested in Brandom’s or Sellars’s work, the history of expressivism, or the history of analytic philosophy more generally will benefit greatly
from this book.
Colin McLear
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Bratman, Michael. Shared Agency.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 219. $105.00 ðclothÞ; $31.95
ðpaperÞ.
Shared Agency brings together and further refines ideas in the theory of collective agency and action that Michael Bratman has been developing over the past
twenty years or so. In it, he presents his account of shared intention, and its role
in small-scale collective action, in its most comprehensive and systematic form.
The theory presented in Shared Agency is developed in impressive detail; the arguments are careful and rigorous; and the overall view is both illuminating and
challenging. It is a major achievement and a must-read for anyone interested in
issues of collective action and intentionality.
FROM INDIVIDUAL TO SHARED AGENCY
The target phenomenon Bratman sets out to theorize is the form of agency exhibited by relatively small, nonhierarchical groups of people when they intentionally do something together—for example, singing an impromptu duet or

